US FCC to update undersea cable regulations amid suspected cable sabotage incidents — proposals include restricting Chinese companies from building cable components
The protection of undersea internet cables is a matter of national security.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) says that it will review and update its rules regarding submarine communications cables, especially after the incident in the Baltic Sea earlier this week where a Chinese freighter sailing from Russia is suspected to have sabotaged two undersea internet cables that connect Sweden and Finland to the rest of Central Europe, not to mention numerous other cable sabotage incidents spanning multiple regions this year. According to Reuters, this update will address the U.S.’s national security concerns for the more than 400 undersea cables that keep the world interconnected.
This physical network handles over 98% of internet traffic, and while damage to one or two cables, especially for well-connected areas, would have a minor impact, any major disruption caused by a deliberate and well-coordinated attack would have global ramifications. For example, while the average user simply relies on these cables for entertainment (i.e., streaming music and videos, casual browsing, and online gaming), the international financial market is also heavily reliant on the internet, and losing that could cost millions if not billions, of dollars in lost productivity.
Aside from the recent incident in the Baltic Sea, there have already been other reports of deliberate sabotage of communications cables. For example, a fiber optic cable was sabotaged in France during the Olympic games, disrupting telecommunications in several French regions. Taiwan also accused China of cutting two undersea cables connecting its Matsu Islands to the country’s main island, while Houthi rebels are thought to have damaged three underwater internet cables connecting Europe and Asia. Last year, another Chinese cargo ship reportedly dragged an anchor for "hundreds of kilometers," thus damaging a gas pipeline in the Baltic that connects Finland and Estonia. Finland contends the incident was intentional.
“With the expansion of data centers, rise of cloud computing, and increasing bandwidth demands of new large language models, these facilities are poised to grow even more critical,” FCC Chairperson Jessica Rosenworcel said, referring to undersea communications cables. She also said, “While the details of these incidents remain in dispute, what is clear is that these facilities—with locations that are openly published to prevent damage—are becoming a target.”
The agency proposes that foreign companies should not be allowed to obtain cable landing licenses if they’ve previously been denied a telecommunications license due to national security grounds. These include major Chinese firms like Huawei, ZTE, China Telecom, and China Mobile. This proposal is similar to the New York Joint Statement that the U.S. proposed in September, which ensures that the country, E.U. member states, and other allied countries would only use trusted suppliers to ensure security.
In light of this development, the Chinese Embassy in Washington released a statement saying that “turning undersea cables into a political and security issue severely disrupts international market rules, threatens global digital connectivity and cybersecurity, and denies other countries, especially developing countries, the right to develop their undersea cable industry.” But despite that announcement, the White House has been expressing concern about China’s role in handling global internet traffic and the potential that Beijing could use it for espionage. After all, the U.S. knows how vulnerable undersea cables could be to tapping, having used the same technique against the Soviets during the Cold War with Operation Ivy Bells.
Stay On the Cutting Edge: Get the Tom's Hardware Newsletter
Get Tom's Hardware's best news and in-depth reviews, straight to your inbox.
Jowi Morales is a tech enthusiast with years of experience working in the industry. He’s been writing with several tech publications since 2021, where he’s been interested in tech hardware and consumer electronics.
-
tamalero Didn't the US also cut Iran's and some other fiber connections using their special tech subs?Reply -
bolweval What they need to do is install a copper conductor in the cable with a 100kv's on it. If someone try's to cut that we'll know who it is because they will still be stuck to it, or floating on the water above it.Reply -
bolweval
I hadn't heard about that, link?tamalero said:Didn't the US also cut Iran's and some other fiber connections using their special tech subs? -
ivan_vy how restricting companies from building undersea cables protects from being cut? it will be make them more expensive to make, maintain, repair and replace. USA is growing paranoid and protectionist by each passing day ... or the USA companies trying to protect their business? free market is not a good thing when you are losing on your own game.Reply
Guess who will have to pay for the rising costs? -
bit_user
That would've been an electrical cable, not fiber optic. Data rates, back then, were probably like kilobits/sec, not Tb/s rates we're getting into now.The article said:having used the same technique against the Soviets during the Cold War -
bit_user
It doesn't. That's to address another threat, which is that a cable is owned by an entity that can be subjected to another (potentially hostile) government's interests. Those interests could include eavesdropping, traffic filtering, or even ceasing operations. If the remote endpoint shuts down, it's effectively the same as if the cable was physically cut.ivan_vy said:how restricting companies from building undersea cables protects from being cut? -
jg.millirem Regarding tapping cables, there seems to be amnesia here about the Edward Snowden revelations, all the spying that the US does on international and domestic traffic, not acknowledged in this article. China and other actors are merely trying to copy what the US has long done.Reply -
tamalero
Hard to find now with the insane amount of news repeating the information from the baltic cables being cut "possibly by Russian submarines".bolweval said:I hadn't heard about that, link?
But it was between 2015-2020 after a supposed internet collapse affecting India and many Asian nations. And it was located in an undersea cable that connected near Iran.
bit_user said:That would've been an electrical cable, not fiber optic. Data rates, back then, were probably like kilobits/sec, not Tb/s rates we're getting into now.
Supposedly the next generation of spy tools splices the fiber optic, set up a listening device, then "fix"while the sub moves the data..
jg.millirem said:Regarding tapping cables, there seems to be amnesia here about the Edward Snowden revelations, all the spying that the US does on international and domestic traffic, not acknowledged in this article. China and other actors are merely trying to copy what the US has long done.
This!
US has had backdoors on many network devices for their intelligence services.
Hence why the US fears chips from HuaWei and similar are using similar technology to have backdoors for China.
Let 's not even mention the firewalls and antivirus having to forcibly give the master keys to the intelligence services in the US if they want to even sell their products there. XD -
ivan_vy
I think the traffic hijacking is easier to be done in the servers side more than the cable itself, this looks like trying to piggyback on the situation injecting FUD to accomplish another goal: monopolizing the cable industry.bit_user said:It doesn't. That's to address another threat, which is that a cable is owned by an entity that can be subjected to another (potentially hostile) government's interests. Those interests could include eavesdropping, traffic filtering, or even ceasing operations. If the remote endpoint shuts down, it's effectively the same as if the cable was physically cut.