Despite strict sanctions imposed by the United States preventing semiconductor shipments to Russia, Russian weapons discovered on Ukrainian battlefields purportedly have an alarming amount of U.S.-manufactured chips inside. Bloomberg revealed a variety of records on how Russia has been able to purchase U.S.-based chips, unbeknownst to the U.S.-based chip makers themselves.
Russia's military is reportedly using third parties to purchase U.S.-based electronic products from Texas Instruments Inc., and some of these intermediaries are even comprised of companies that are under U.S. sanctions. These chips are purportedly used to assist in the production of "...drones, glide bombs, precision communication systems and the Iskander missiles that Moscow uses to hammer Ukraine’s cities."
Bloomberg reports that one case it reviewed revealed that a major Russian distributor handled orders for hundreds of thousands of Texas Instruments products amounting to roughly $6 million worth of value from January 2024 to August 2024. Nearly $4 million of these orders were headed ultimately to Russian military companies.
These products (at least many of them) are getting to Russia (unsurprisingly) through a third country, with many deliveries crossing multiple jurisdictions before making their way to Russia. This makes tracking down any Russian-bound shipments particularly difficult since exports to countries outside of Russia (or any allies of Russia specifically) are not banned.
Some of these third-party distributors have purportedly made it incredibly easy for Russia and its military to purchase chips from Texas Instruments (again without the manufacturer knowing what's going on). These distributors have websites with information integrated from Texas Instruments' own online shop, enabling the Russians to research and buy whatever Texas Instruments is selling as if they were Western customers themselves.
It remains a mystery how these third parties are able to cipher through Texas Instruments store, but Bloomberg reveals that the two portals where Russia is able to purchase Texas Instruments products have up-to-date pricing information from the chipmaker's real store. It is believed that these third parties are using an API to grab data from Texas Instrument's store and update it in real-time (or at least frequently) though it remains a mystery how this API is able to function at all. Texas Instruments purportedly does not provide any API connections to any Russian company.
Texas Instruments and the U.S. government are reportedly struggling to get a grasp on this problem and how to solve it. Not only are many of these Russian military-bound exports making a detour to a third-party country before stopping at their final destination. Not all of these shipments are being shipped exclusively to the Russian military; some shipments are seemingly also being exported to civilians for civilian use.
Edit 12/11/2024 7:30am PT: Texas Instruments sent over the following statement:
TI devotes significant time and resources to keep our products out of Russia which includes developing, implementing and refining robust policies and procedures to combat illicit diversion. We stopped selling products into Russia in February 2022 and prohibit our customers and distributors from reselling our chips into Russia.
TI does not and has not provided any API connection to any Russian company or website, and the two Russian websites that Bloomberg identified do not have any direct access to a TI API. TI also prevents any Russian IP address from accessing the TI website or any information directly from TI, including through an API connection, and takes steps to block bad actors from evading our firewalls.
TI’s global trade compliance program was developed in accordance with guidance from the Department of Commerce and incorporates third-party risk management databases as part of its multi-layered screening process to monitor the sale and shipment of its chips. TI screens customers and orders at least three times during the ordering process. We screen, on average, 4 million orders per year, and cancel thousands every year that pose credible concerns. If we find evidence indicating product diversion or improper access to TI information, we investigate and take action.
